Embedded computers control an increasing number of systems directly interacting with humans, while also manage more and more personal or sensitive information. As a result, both safety and security are becoming ubiquitous requirements in embedded computers, and automotive is not an exception to that. In this paper we analyze time-predictability (as an example of safety concern) and side-channel a acks (as an example of security issue) in cache memories. While injecting randomization in cache timingbehavior addresses each of those concerns separately, we show that randomization solutions for time-predictability do not protect against side-channel a acks and vice-versa. We then propose a randomization solution to achieve both safety and security goals.
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly autonomous and connected Automotive Systems (ATS) require on-board computing systems with resilient operation under timing faults and a acks. On the one hand, increased connectivity opens the door to security threats, e.g. side-channel a acks (SCA), an e ective security intrusion for obtaining secret keys. In particular, cache timing SCA ( referred to as SCA) allows a ackers to fully or partially recover keys, which can later be used to take control over the ATS. On the other hand, ATS increasingly deal with safety (e.g. autonomous driving), which requires a reliable response time of all critical so ware services. For instance, compliance with ISO-26262 requires so ware units to be assigned time budgets and supporting evidence of adherence to those budgets.
Until recently, ATS comprised relatively simple Electronic Control Units (ECU) deploying 8-and 16-bits microcontrollers. e execution time of so ware on such simple devices was mostly ji erless (or su ering very small execution time variability) simplifying the task of deriving worst-case execution time (WCET) Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. DAC '18, San Francisco, CA, USA © 2018 ACM. 978-1-4503-5700-5/18/06. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/3195970.3196003 estimates and mitigating the risk of SCA. However, the advent of more complex value-added so ware functionalities, managing increasing amounts of diverse data, has raised the performance needs for the automotive sector, for which ARM expects a 100x increase in performance by 2024 w.r.t. 2016 [6] .
e execution time of tasks on complex hardware strongly depends on their input data and processor's state, thus exposing the system to SCA. is is a major concern for ATS to protect sensible information and prevent safety issues as ATS control critical aspects with humans in the loop, e.g. autonomous driving.
Interestingly, randomization has been independently proposed as a solution for WCET estimation and preventing SCA. For WCET estimation, the most extended industrial practice builds on collecting execution time measurements of the so ware running on the target platform. Obtaining evidence about whether those measurements are representative of the WCET during operation is challenging on complex hardware [1] . ese di culties have been addressed by using probabilistic techniques to WCET analysis, so called Measurement-Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA) techniques [10] . MBPTA bene ts from injecting randomization in cache timing to simplify modeling and provide evidence for certi cation as needed by safety standards. For SCA, randomization solutions break the dependence between input data (and/or cache state) and execution time so that for the same input data and processor state a su ciently random execution time is experienced. However, it remains to be proven whether a single solution can tackle both, WCET and SCA issues.
In this context we make the following contributions:
We make an in-depth analysis of the properties required to enable MBPTA to deal with ji ery timing behavior of applications running on complex hardware. We also cover how randomization helps dealing with SCA . We describe the vulnerability of randomization support for MBPTA to speci c SCA. Likewise, we assess the time predictability of randomization support for SCA solutions showing that they fail to meet MBPTA principles.
We propose Time-Predictable Secure Cache (TSCache) that provides increased resilience in front of speci c SCA while keeping MBPTA compliance. Hence TSCache reconciles security (robustness against certain SCA) and safety (by adhering to MBPTA principles to derive reliable timing budgets) in cache design.
With a simulator modeling a commercial automotive processor, we experimentally show the resilience of our solution against the Bernstein a ack [7] while keeping MBPTA compliance.
2 MBPTA AND SCA PROTECTION 2.1 Random Caches for MBPTA MBPTA delivers a probabilistic WCET (pWCET) distribution representing the highest probability with which one run of a task Figure 1 (right) shows an illustrative pWCET distribution for which the probability of the task exceeding 7ms is below 10 −10 per run. MBPTA is well-se led with industrial case studies performed in automotive, avionics, and space [14, 17, 29] .
O en, in automotive, system integrators subcontract the development of certain so ware to di erent so ware providers. Across so ware integrations of the so ware units contributed by each provider, the objects of a function (i.e. globals, stack and code) can change their addresses resulting in di erent cache layouts, with arbitrarily di erent hits/misses and execution time [19] . In general, it is unfeasible for users creating test scenarios during the analysis phase (AP) accounting for the worst memory placement (and cache layouts) that can occur during system's operation phase (OP) [1] .
Cache randomization [15, 24] ensures that a new random cache layout is exercised on every program run so that the impact of caches on execution time becomes independent of the actual memory layout.
is relieves users from controlling memory/cache layout of objects since (random) cache layouts experienced during AP and OP are probabilistically identical. MBPTA builds upon collecting a sample of execution times of the task under analysis on the target platform and verifying that those samples meet certain statistical properties in order to properly apply statistical tools to enable timing analysis, see Figure 1 (le ). In particular, MBPTA applies Extreme Value eory (EVT) [10] that requires independence and identical distribution of the execution times [10] .
Cache randomization involves three main elements: a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), random placement and random replacement, the la er of which is optional. Several works show the existence of low-overhead PRNG that provide enough quality in the sequences produced to avoid correlations [3] . Regarding random placement [15, 16, 24] , it requires to adhere to certain properties for MBPTA compliance (referred to as mbpta-px).
mbpta-p1 Time composability across incremental so ware integration ensures that early phase WCET estimates (ideally at the unit testing level) hold upon integration. is decreases the risk of costly detection of timing violations during late design phases. Time composability, relates cache layouts, i.e. how addresses are mapped to cache sets, during AP and OP. Time composability builds on one of the following properties on random cache placement.
mbpta-p2 Full Randomness. Let us assume two di erent addresses A and B, i.e. they di er at least in one bit (excluding o set bits within the cache line) and a cache with S sets.
(1) A (and B) is randomly placed to di erent sets for di erent seeds: at is, there exist seeds seed i , seed j and seed k so that S
, and S Note that, for any seed, it is not needed that A and B have the same probability of being mapped to the same set.
mbpta-p3 Partial APOP-xed Randomness. In this case, randomization is carried out at memory page boundary.
(1) If A and B are in the same page boundary, the probability to map them to the same set is null for any seed. (2) If A and B belong to di erent pages, the same principles than for full-randomization apply. (3) It is required to keep the same memory-page alignment during AP and OP so that if A and B belong to di erent pages at OP, they also do in experiments carried out at AP.
Cache Timing Side-Channel Attacks (SCA)
With cache timing-based SCA, or simply SCA, the a acker infers information about the keys based on the execution time variability caused by cache memories [7, 8, 25] . SCA exploit the di erence in time that memory access pa erns expose; in particular, hit and miss pa erns that occur in caches. When these pa erns are related to the placement of the data in memory, for instance, a ackers can exploit the deterministic behavior of high-performance computing caches to extract cryptographic keys [7] . In particular, SCA are enabled by i) the time di erence between accesses: misses on a cache take longer to resolve than hits, hence leaking which data is being used and present in cache, and which data is not there; and ii) the use of table lookups that are input-dependent in cryptographic algorithms (e.g. AES). In this paper we focus on the particular SCA a ack referred to as Contention Based a acks [18] . Contention a acks are based on con icts between cache lines, and include Prime-Probe and Evict-Time a acks. Given that accesses to the lookup tables depend on the input data, an a acker is able to extract cryptographic keys by measuring the time it takes to the victim or to itself to load certain data. Most of this kind of a acks assume that the a acker shares the use of the processor with the victim [23] . However, it is not necessary to have a contender in the same processor in order to perform contention a acks: Bernstein [7] proved that interference inside the victim's own accesses might be enough to reveal full cryptographic keys.
Let Ω be the universe of input states, Γ the universe of execution times that a task can exhibit, t γ ω the execution time γ ∈ Γ of a cryptographic task given the input ω ∈ Ω, and P (t γ ω ) the probability of observing such execution time. For protection against SCA, scap1 cache designs must ensure that no correlation exists between the input data and the observed execution time. In this way, any single input state can exhibit several execution times with equal probability, thus preventing any a acker from identifying the input state from the execution time: ∀i ∈ Ω, ∀ ∈ Γ | P (t i ) = 1 |Γ | .
ASSESSING THE TIME-PREDICTABILITY OF SECURE CACHE DESIGNS
e RPCache [27] decouples cache interference of the a acker from the victim by randomizing interference whenever a memory access from a process di erent from the victim's one contends for the same cache line. On the event of a contention event that might leak information, a random set is selected for replacement. So far the MBPTA compliance of this design has not been assessed. In particular we identify two features of this approach that fail to meet MBPTA requirements: First, the timing behavior of the task under analysis depends on the actual addresses accessed. erefore, WCET estimates do not hold across integration with other so ware units, which may change the actual addresses of the task and hence, change its timing behavior arbitrarily. is prevents achieving time composability (requirement mbpta-p1). And second, contender tasks produce cache evictions in random sets upon contention with the task under analysis. Hence, since whether contention exists is fully dependent on task's contenders behavior, so is the case for task's cache evictions. us, the WCET estimate obtained for the task strongly depends on the contenders behavior, typically unknown in early design phases (when WCET estimates need to be successfully assessed against timing budgets). is is against time composability needed in ATS (mbpta-p1), as explained before.
e Newcache [28] builds on the same concept as RPCache and introduces several improvements to reconcile high-performance and security, o ering low miss rates and faster accesses. However, the main concept and limitations for MBPTA-compliance behind the placement policy remains the same as for RPCache.
Aciicmez [2] proposes a placement policy to secure instruction caches that randomizes the cache set where addresses are placed by XORing the index bits with a random number. Let's assume two addresses A and B and further assume that they have identical index bits. Hence they are placed in the same set with modulo. By XORing their (identical) index bits with a random number, the set obtained is random, but identical for both addresses, hence breaking mbpta-p2 principles. Furthermore, if A and B have di erent index bits they are placed in di erent sets with modulo. By XORing their (di erent) index bits with a random number, the set obtained is also di erent, so they are placed in di erent sets. is breaks mbptap2 since it is not the case that for di erent seeds seed i and seed j :
While [2] performs a random permutation of cache sets based on the random number used, its timing behavior is strictly dependent on the addresses and analogous to that of modulo placement, breaking mbpta-p1. Also, performance (and so WCET) are strictly dependent on the actual addresses accessed, so WCET estimates become invalid upon integration since di erent memory locations of objects will lead to arbitrarily di erent cache con icts.
ASSESSING THE SCA-ROBUSTNESS OF TIME-PREDICTABLE CACHE DESIGNS
For MBPTA compliance caches implement random placement and (optionally) random replacement. Random placement, determines the cache set where an address is mapped by operating the address (tag and index bits) together with a random number called random seed or just seed [15, 16, 24] . e remaining address bits (o set Given an address and a seed, random placement delivers a xed cache set. However, di erently to the proposal by Aciicmez [2] , addresses are placed randomly and independently in cache. For instance, addresses A and B are placed on the same set for some seeds only. Hence, cache con icts across di erent seeds are random, making actual addresses irrelevant when determining the cache sets they are mapped to. is relieves the end user from controlling memory mapping. Two di erent designs implement random placement: hash-based parametric random placement (hashRP) [16] and random modulo (RM) [15, 24] , see Figure 2 .
HashRP [16] operates on tag+index address bits with a seed by means of rotator blocks and XOR gates so that con icts in di erent sets are made random, see Figure 2 (a). HashRP poses no constraint on whether cache lines need to belong to the same page. Its performance is slightly lower than that of RM and modulo placement, but it is compatible with second level (L2) and third level (L3) caches whose way size may be much larger than the page size. HashRP achieves Full Randomness (mbpta-p2).
RM [15, 24] takes as input the XORed bits of the seed with the index and tag bits of the address, see Figure 2 (b).
e XORed index bits are the input to a Benes Network [4] and the XORed tag bits are used to drive the network. e output of this Benes Network is a randomized permutation of the index bits that point to a particular cache set. RM is compatible with caches whose page size is equal or a multiplier of the cache way size. O en rst level (L1) caches use a way size equal to the page size. With RM each address is placed in a random set with uniform probability, but addresses in the same page are placed in di erent cache sets. RM is compatible with MBPTA when contents in each memory page are preserved across integrations (easily achieved by current RTOS), while allowing pages move freely in the memory space. Overall, RM achieves Partial APOP-xed Randomness (mbpta-p3).
Compliance with SCA protection properties. MBPTA compliance for caches relies on random placement to exhibit randomized execution times. To achieve SCA robustness, random placement must also decouple cache interference of the a acker from the victim. at is, memory addresses from victim and a acker's processes must not contend systematically in the same cache set. Instead, each memory address from each process must be randomly and independently placed in a set, thus randomizing interference. In the following section we detail how to achieve time-predictability and security against SCA in the same design. 
TIME-SECURE CACHES
In order to a ain both, MBPTA-compliance and SCA robustness, either MBPTA-randomization solutions are made SCA-aware or sca-randomization solutions are made MBPTA-aware. Without loss of generality, we opt for the former. SCA-aware caches cause variations in timing behavior for which achieving MBPTA-compliance require speci c ad-hoc solutions. Studying those solutions is part of our future work.
HashRP and RM preserve the same seed during the execution of a task, so that cache contents can be retrieved and kept consistent. When cache contents are private to each task (there is no shared data), then ushing is not needed across di erent tasks despite using di erent seeds since consistency is not a ected. Whenever a given task instance (job) executes, then either cache contents need to be ushed or the seed used in the previous job of the task has to be used again to preserve consistency.
MBPTA-compliance adds light constraints on seed management. Depending on the scope of the application of the WCET estimate, which for instance de nes whether exceedance thresholds apply to the task as a whole or to each job independently, the granularity at which the seed has to be changed varies. On one extreme of the spectrum the seed is (randomly) set once before the execution of the rst job of a task. On the other extreme of the spectrum the seed is changed right before every job release.
Interestingly MBPTA-compliance sets no constraint on the seeds used for di erent so ware units (tasks), which threatens security since two di erent tasks could have the same seed and therefore their behavior can be reproduced.
In the context of SCA, for contention a acks if the a acker task is allowed to use the same seed as the task under analysis, then it will have the same (random) placement as the victim. Hence, it will have the ability to learn about the victim as we show later in the evaluation section, using contention-based a acks. Instead, if each task is forced to have a di erent seed, con icts between a acker's and victim's cache lines are random and independent across runs, thus defeating any contention-based a ack, since the a acker loses the ability to create contention for speci c victim's data.
Implementing per-process unique seeds. In order to prevent contention-based a acks with hashRP and RM, a di erent seed has to be provided to each process which requires some Operating System (OS) support, see Figure 3 . In the context of AUTOSAR, applications are divided into so ware components (SWC), and each SWC is further divided into runnables (the atomic unit of execution). Each runnable has an associated execution period, see Figure 3 , where an application has 2 SWC (SWC1 and SWC2), and another 1 SWC (SWC3), consisting of 1, 2, and 2 runnables respectively. For instance, runnable R 2 executes every 10ms and it produces some output read by R 3 . Also, SWC1 produces some output read by SWC2.
Communication across runnables in the same SWC can be done via shared memory, whereas across SWP with message passing. Finally, runnables of di erent SWC are organized into tasks where each task has a speci c execution period. For instance, task A includes all runnables with period 10ms (R 1 and R 2 ). Runnables are scheduled within a task preserving application dependencies.
In order to allow the communication between runnables of a given SWC via shared memory, with the TSCache all runnables of a given SWC must use the same seed. Preserving the same seed across runnables of the same SWC also reduces the number of cache ushes and hence, overheads. In the case of runnables of di erent SWC, they may have been developed by di erent providers (even if they belong to the same application). Hence, they must not use the same seed to prevent contention-based a acks across SWCs 1 . is implies that, on a context switch across runnables of di erent SWC, the OS must store the seed in the task struct of the SWC, empty the pipeline, and restore the seed of the incoming SWC.
is way SWCs cannot learn from the cache behavior of the other SWCs. is is indicated in Figure 3 with red arrows and the seed that needs to be set. Note that whenever the OS is invoked (e.g. during R 5 ), the OS seed needs to be used for memory consistency and to prevent also contention-based a acks. Finally, whenever the whole hyperperiod elapses (20ms in the example), the OS needs to set new random seeds and ush cache contents. is ensures that execution times across runnables in di erent hyperperiods are random and independent. Note, however, that if the instances of a given runnable within a hyperperiod use the same seed, their timing is not independent (e.g. the two instances of R 1 ). e only practical implication is that their -arbitrarily low -exceedance probability is not independent and, if one of those instances would ever overrun its pWCET, all other instances of this runnable in the hyperperiod could also do it.
Despite seeds are changed o en, cache is not ushed, so the overhead is negligible (emptying the pipeline and updating seed registers). Instead, cache ushing occurs only once per hyperperiod, as already needed for MBPTA compliance.
6 CASE STUDY 6.1 Methodology 6.1.1 Berstein A ack and Threat Model. Due to the current nature of ATS, Bernstein's a ack [7] is a realistic scenario, since a acker and victim do not have to share the processor during the contention a ack, thus being less restrictive. Additionally the vector of a ack for Bernstein's intrusion matches the processor architecture currently used in ATS (i.e. the cache hierarchy).
We emulate two independent processors that execute cryptographic operations independently, the victim and the a acker. Both processors execute 128-bit AES encryption functions. For the attacker the key is known, for the victim, a randomized 128 bits key is generated. We collect then timing measurements from the processes of encryption, and then we perform a statistical correlation on the timing pro les of a acker and victim to nd the secret victim's key. In the original Bernstein's experiment, victim's timing measurements were taken on the victim's machine to reduce interference. Hence, performing the analysis on-line or o -line gives exactly the same result. For this experiment victim and a acker obtain 10 7 samples of AES encryption operations each.
We try Bernstein's a ack on di erent setups, basically extracting for each 16-byte input value the average computation time per byte and value. In particular, we evaluate the robustness of the di erent setups by executing the a ack and observing how much information (bits from the key) the a ack is able to disclose. When computing the correlation between execution times observed and key values, we use for each byte the most stringent correlation factor so that (1) the number of combinations preserved is minimized while (2) keeping the correct value amongst those regarded as feasible. Hence, this is the best case for the a acker.
Experimental Setup.
We use a cycle accurate simulator based on SocLib [22] , modi ed accordingly to include the RPCache, HashRP and RM caches.
e processor setup resembles the ARM920T [5] a single-core automotive microcontroller chip. We model a 5-stage processor; with 16KB, 128 sets, 4-way rst level instruction and data caches; and a 256KB, 2048 sets, 4-way L2 cache. We evaluate four di erent setups: (a) deterministic: a baseline vulnerable processor with time-deterministic caches; (b) RPCache: a secure processor implementing the RPCache [27] ; (c) MBPTACache: a processor implementing a random cache for MBPTA compliance; and (d) TSCache: our proposal to simultaneously handle timing and SCA. For MBPTACache and TSCache, the L1 caches implement RM while the shared L2 cache HashRP.
Results
6.2.1 SCA robustness. In Figure 4 we show how certain values for a given input (byte number 4) take slightly longer to be processed on the baseline deterministic setup. ose values with higher execution time allow the a acker to retrieve the value of the particular byte of the key or, at least, reduce the number of potential combinations drastically so that a brute force exploration of the (limited) remaining combinations can break the key. Figure 5 shows for each cache setup the di erent bytes of the key in the y-axis and their potential values in the x-axis. White cells correspond to values e ectively discarded by the a ack, whereas grey cells correspond, to values that could not be discarded. Black cells correspond to the particular value of the key. Hence, the whiter, the more e ective the a ack. As shown, Bernstein's a ack is e ective for half of the bytes on the deterministic setup (top le plot): the a ack is able to determine 33 bits out of the 128 bits of the key and other combinations are also discarded, the number of remaining combinations in decreases down to 2 80 . is number of potential key values is below the 2 128 , decreasing the cost of a brute force a ack by a factor of 2 48 .
For the RPCache, the same bytes as for the baseline setup are vulnerable to the a ack. However, the RPCache proves to be stronger in front of this a ack by keeping the number of potential keys to explore at 2 108 . Still, some information is leaked. When using the MBPTACache (bo om le plot), vulnerability to the a ack occurs in di erent bytes as for the other caches. Overall, the number of potential key values is 2 104 , thus close to the case of the RPcache.
Finally, with the proposed TSCache, the best case a ack is unable to disregard any value for any byte. Since TSCache makes placement fully random and independent of the actual address accessed across di erent seeds, Bernstein's a ack fails to reveal any information, thus preserving key strength at 2 128 . In fact, Bernstein's a ack regards some values as more likely to be the key ones for several bytes, but discarding the key value for some of those bytes. Hence, TSCache, rather than preventing the a ack from inferring any information by transforming it into noise, fools the a acker by providing wrong information that would not allow a brute force a ack to reveal the key if fewer combinations are explored.
Generalization. Contention-based a acks, such as Bernstein's one, rely on deterministic eviction of controlled cache lines. Hence, Prime-Probe and Evict-Time A acks, both contention-based, are thwarted by using secure time-predictable caches since the cache layouts of di erent processes are completely independent and randomized. As explained in section 4, those a acks rely on the ability to reproduce and infer from timing pro les the inputs used by the victim. By having di erent seeds for victim and a acker tasks, their input state di ers and so the timing pro les also di er. Hence, contention-based a acks cannot relate execution time variations with any other information, thus failing as Bernstein's one. 6.2.2 MBPTA-compliance. TSCache achieves Partial APOP-xed Randomness properties (mbpta-p3), maintaining MBPTA-compliance, see Section 2. We further validated that the observed execution time ful lls the independence and identical distribution properties as required by EVT as used in MBPTA. We use the Ljung-Box independence test [9] to test autocorrelation for 20 di erent lags simultaneously, a very strong independence test. We have also applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample i.d. test [13] . All our samples have passed both tests for a α = 0.05 signi cance level.
6.2.3 Overheads. RM and HashRP area and performance overheads are as follows. Area. RM and HashRP caches have already been implemented on a LEON3-based multicore processor causing no operating frequency degradation on an FPGA [15] . In terms of area, while we cannot isolate the cost of cache modi cations, making the whole processor MBPTA-compliant (so modifying all caches, bus arbitration and FP units included) and adding an enhanced tracing feature costed less than 1% processor area increase. Performance. hashRP and RM have been shown to have no e ect on the maximum operating frequency of their FPGA implementation [15] . Also, they have similar cache behaviour to that of standard modulo placement. Specially RM has shown a miss rate 1% far from modulo [15] , hence with negligible impact on average performance. e impact in performance due to the seed change is also negligible. Seed changes are produced for security reasons for which restoring the seed of the process to be executed next would only require to wait until all accesses in ight of the previous process have been served, which would take tens of cycles. Also changing the seed for time-predictability reasons this implies ushing the cache. However this is required at coarser granularity, hence the relative cost of ushing is contained.
RELATED WORK
RM and hashRP caches have been implemented on a commercial design [26] showing negligible area and operating frequency impact are negligible. While performance cost of RM and hashRP has been shows low w.r.t. default deterministic cache designs in industrial case studies [14, 17, 29] , RM and hashRP are only needed for timeor security-critical tasks. ey can be disabled at will for e ciency reasons for other applications by bypassing RM and hashRP modules, and forwarding index bits from the address directly to cache decoders since RM and hashRP implementation is li le intrusive and does not a ect the design of the main cache components.
Several works mitigate di erent cache SCA [12, 23] . In this context, cache partitioning has been proposed to solve both, contentionbased SCA [11, 27] and to achieve time predictability [20] . e idea is to disable interference by isolating cache lines across di erent processes. However, cache partitioning severely limits the e ectiveness of shared caches in multicores a ecting both, performance and the ability to share data across threads running in di erent cores [21] . is relates to the di culties to partition also all cache bu ers and queues, as well as to the performance impact of reduced cache associativity per partition.
Randomization mitigates the amount of information leaked [11, 18, 27] . However, as stated previously, the applicability of these solutions to timing analysis is inherently compromised. Overall, to the best of our knowledge this is the rst work proposing hardware designs that address both, timing analysis and SCA concerns.
CONCLUSIONS
Increasing performance needs in ATS require the adoption of highperformance hardware features such as caches, that however, challenge time-predictability and make systems vulnerable to timingbased SCA. While those concerns have been addressed individually, existing solutions have not been proven compatible for both concerns. We analyzed the suitability of the solutions devised for each concern against the requirements of the other, proving that they fail to achieve both goals simultaneously.We propose TSCache which e ectively delivers time-predictability for MBPTA and robustness against contention cache-timing SCA
